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IOWA COURT UPHOLDS PROPERTY RIGHTS
OF LANDOWNERS AND INVALIDATES
NUISANCE PROTECTION LAW
-by Roger A. McEowen* and Neil E. Harl**
In late September, the Iowa Supreme Court in B rmann v. Board of Supervisors In
And For Kossuth County,1 invalidated an Iowa law designed to preserve agricultural
land and provide farmers protection from nuisance lawsuits.2  The Iowa law allowed
counties to designate agricultural areas of at least 300 contiguous acres.3  Farming
operations conducted within a designated area were not subject to nuisance lawsuits if
they operated properly.4
The court ruled that this immunity created a property right, an easement to create
odors, over land adjacent to the agricultural area’s boundary.  Property rights are
constitutionally protected and cannot be taken by governmental action unless paid for.5
Following this constitutional provision, the court ruled that the Iowa law was
unconstitutional because the county did not pay the neighbors who would be required to
endure the odors and the neighbors could not bring a nuisance action to limit or stop
odor production.  The case is the first of its kind in the country where a court has
invalidated a state law designed, in part, to provide nuisance protection to farm and
ranch operations.
Court’s reasoning sound
The court’s decision protecting property rights of adjacent owners is consistent with
the court’s earlier opinion in a 1979 case.6  In Woodbury County Soil Conservation
District v.Ortner, the court upheld an Iowa soil conservation law against a constitutional
challenge.7  The law limited the amount of soil erosion from farms.  A landowner
claimed that his farm was suffering damage from water and soil erosion from another
farmer’s land.  The soil conservation district agreed and ordered the farmer to bring the
soil loss within acceptable limits by either seeding the land to permanent pasture or
haying or terracing the land.  These measures were costly and the farmer challenged the
soil conservation law as an unconstitutional taking of his private property.  The court
disagreed, thereby upholding the neighbor’s private property right to be free from
damage caused by an adjacent farm’s excessive water and soil erosion.  Ortner8 wa  a
nuisance case involving soil erosion.  Bormann9 involved odors and the court’s opinion
is consistent with Ortner.10 A state can enact legislation to prevent a nuisance resulting
from excessive soil and water erosion, but cannot enact legislation that would allow a
nuisance to be created.  The court protected property rights in both cases.
A fundamental question in Ort er,11 Bormann12 and every nuisance case is whether a
nuisance should be permitted where there is no present use on the plaintiff’s land to
form the basis of an objection.  In other words, the legal question in every nuisance
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action is whether there is a property right to conduct an activity
that would constitute a nuisance if there were someone around
to object.13 For example, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
stated in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States:14 “Property
rights as a matter of law since Blackstone’s day have been
understood to be subject to the power of the state to abate
nuisances.”15  In other words, the “bundle of sticks” commonly
referred to as “property rights” does not include a right to create
a nuisance as defined by state law and the courts.  Therefore,
the immunity provision of the Iowa Agricultural Area Law16
created a property right not otherwise contained in the “bundle
of sticks.”
As the Bormann17 court noted, under Iowa law the right to
maintain a nuisance is an easement.18 Thus, the immunity
provision would allow landowners to conduct an activity on
their land which could be a nuisance if they did not have the
easement.  Because an easement is an interest in real property,
it is subject to federal and state constitutional just compensation
requirements.
The United States Supreme Court will allow governmental
entities to regulate real or personal property for public good
without the requirement of compensation so long as the action
is not an unreasonable infringement of the rights of the private
property owner.  Thus, in these situations, a balancing of the
benefit to society of the particular regulation and the burden
imposed on the landowner is conducted.19 However, no
balancing is required where the government transfers a property
right of one owner to another unless justified by an emergency
or compensation is paid.20
The basic point is that landowners have the right to use and
enjoy their property in any manner so long as their activities do
not conflict with adjoining landowners’ similar right to use and
enjoy their property.  A state law that defines an activity
constituting a nuisance is constitutional if reasonable, but a
state law that takes a property right without awarding
compensation is per se unconstitutional.
Impact on right-to-farm laws?
What is the likely impact of the court’s decision?  The
implications could be particularly important for Iowa in that
most of Iowa’s 99 counties have agricultural areas.  Moreover,
every state has enacted a right-to-farm law that is designed to
protect existing agricultural operations by giving a defense in
nuisance suits to farmers and ranchers who meet the legal
requirements.21  The basic thrust of a particular state’s right-to-
farm law is that it is unfair for a person to move next to a
farming operation knowing the conditions which might be
present and then ask a court to declare the farm a nuisance.
Thus, the purpose of a right-to-farm law is to create a legal and
economic climate in which farm operations can be continued.
While the Iowa right-to-farm law was not at issue in this case, a
question can be raised whether the Iowa court or another state
court might determine that its right-to-farm law gives farmers a
property right to produce odors over adjacent land.  If so, right-
to-farm laws may be in peril.  However, concern over the
constitutionality of right-to-farm laws may be unwarranted.
These laws likely do not create a property right, but are similar
to statutes defining activity constituting a nuisance.  Indeed,
many right-to-farm laws only provide protection if the farming
operation is in compliance with applicable state and federal
regulations and was in operation before the complaining party
located nearby.22 For example, in Kansas, the right-to-farm law
ly creates a presumption that a farm is not a nuisance if the
statutory requirements are satisfied,23 and the statute provides
no protection against lawsuits brought by fellow farmers.24
Thus, those right-to-farm laws that represent reasonable
restrictions on land use will likely be upheld as constitutional, if
challenged in court.
Reaction of farm groups
Another important aspect of this case is how the farm
organizations that have emphasized protection for private
property rights will react.  These groups have pushed rather
vigorously in recent years for the courts to recognize private
property rights for farmers and ranchers in areas where
government regulation limits what farmers and ranchers can do
on their land.  Indeed, the Iowa Farm Bureau and the Iowa Pork
Producers helped defend the farmers in this case.   While the
Iowa court unanimously upheld the notion of private property
rights and the requirement that such rights are constitutionally
protected, the private property right at issue was determined to
be “taken” from non-farm landowners through a statutory grant
of mmunity from nuisance lawsuits.
Negotiation-based approach
The Bormann25 decision raises the question of how the law
should address nuisance-type disputes.  A suggested approach
is to ensure that property rights are defined as to what is not
desired to occur and to take the necessary steps to develop a
market in property rights.26  With this perspective, the property
owners who are generating odors are infringing upon the
property rights of surrounding neighbors.  Compensation for
infringement of this right can be recovered through a
framework in which those responsible for the odors and those
who would have to endure them are free to negotiate an
outcome.  The principles are fairly clear: those not polluting do
not pay; those polluting a little pay a little; those polluting a
great deal pay a lot.  Under this approach, each resident within
a specified distance would be free to negotiate a result with the
agricultural operation producing the offensive odors.  Once an
agreement is reached, the agricultural operation could not be
sued for nuisance.  Perhaps the best solution for a particular
offended person might be to accept a modest payment and
endure some odors.  Others might prefer to accept higher levels
of odors and receive more payment.
What results would a negotiation approach encourage?
Paying compensation for odors generated would cause large
confinement operations, for example, to use the very best
anagement to control odors, to employ the most effective
odor-reducing technology, to “buffer” the operation by locating
new facilities in the middle of larger tracts and, in general, to
seek a least-cost solution to the odor problem.  Conceivably, a
confinement operation could control enough land to reduce
odor levels at the boundary to near zero.
A potential drawback of such approach is that if an annual
payment arrangement is worked out, a confinement operation
may fear being subjected to escalating demands in later years.
However, an enforceable long-term agreement specifying
acceptable odor levels could eliminate this problem.  The
agreement would bind subsequent owners and residents.  The
opposite is true also - in the event a one-time payment is
negotiated, the neighbors may fear escalating odor levels in the
later years.  Again, that could be the case unless a long-term
Agricultural Law Digest 167
agreement on odor levels is negotiated.  Also, some might feel
uneasy negotiating with a large, well-heeled feedlot.  However,
this is nearly always a problem, even with the nuisance
approach.  Thus, any system based on a negotiated solution
should provide for mediation if an agreement cannot otherwise
be reached.
What if a confinement unit refused to even discuss the matter?
A solution could be that state permits for construction and
operation of confinement units would not be issued until an
agreement is filed.
It is doubtful that the negotiation approach would encourage
large animal confinement operations to move to other states.
Large producers would be converting the risk of a big lawsuit
over odors to a fixed, one-time or annual set of payments.  Over
time, the cost of this approach could well be less than dealing
continuously with angry neighbors frustrated by right-to-farm
laws that limit their ability to receive compensation for
reductions in property values because of offensive odors.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
     GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
TRUSTEE FEE . The debtor filed for Chapter 7 and had
possession of cattle which were collateral for a secured loan
from a bank. The bank first sought approval from the debtor
and interim trustee to sell some of the cattle. The parties agreed
to the sale and the bank proceeded to have the cattle sold, with
the proceeds paid to the trustee. The debtor arranged for a
second sale without approval from the trustee, with the
proceeds also paid to the trustee. A third sale occurred after the
bank obtained relief from the automatic stay, again with the
proceeds paid to the trustee. The trustee sought payment of the
full trustee fee from the total proceeds from the sale of the
cattle. The court found that the trustee had presented no
evidence of any work done by the trustee to acquire the
proceeds and denied the fees as requested. In r  Chestnut, 222
B.R. 640 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1998).
   FEDERAL TAXATION   -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtor owed taxes for 1979 and 1980 for
which the debtor did not file returns. The IRS constructed
substitute returns without assistance from the debtor and sent
the debtor a tax determination letter. The debtor filed a petition
with the Tax Court to protest the determination but the petition
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The IRS then issued a
notic  of deficiency in a 90-day letter, and the debtor again
contested the deficiency in the Tax Court. The IRS then
as essed t e taxes. The debtor finally filed Forms 870 and 4089
consenting to the assessment more than a year after the 90-day
let er. The debtor sought to have the taxes declared
dischargeable, arguing that the substitute returns should be
considered as the debtor’s returns because the debtor consented
to the assessment by filing the Forms 870 and 4089. The court
held that the substitute returns would not be considered the
d b or’s returns because the debtor did not cooperate with the
IRS in constructing the substitute returns, the debtor challenged
the IRS returns and assessment at every step, and the Forms
870 and 4089 were filed more than a year late. In re Gentry,
